Road to HongKong Stadium from Nathan Rd.
LA Galaxy HK Invitation Football Match Tickets.I got these tickets from adidas store in T.S.T.
09-Mar-2008 Sunday 3:00pm HongKong Stadium.
2008년 3월 8일 토요일
road to meet beckham!
Road to HongKong Stadium from Nathan Rd. LA Galaxy HK Invitation Football Match Tickets.
2008년 2월 29일 금요일
Wellcome to HongKong2008년 1월 30일 수요일
US investment in English football brings profit and success
US investment in English football brings profit and success
Written by: AFP
Derby County´s Pride Park football ground is seen on January 28, as the English Premier league club announced an investment partnership with U.S. sports group General Sports and Entertainment (GSE).
DETROIT, Michigan (AFP) - Fully half of English football's 20 Premiership clubs are owned by foreign investors with a US group completing the purchase of basement-dwelling Derby County for a reported 100 million dollars.
The allure of sport squads linked to a global brand like England's elite league with television riches and home-area expansion potential have enticed Americans to also purchase Manchester United, Aston Villa and Liverpool.
"The long-term aid is to establish the Derby County brand worldwide through successful alliances with sporting teams in the US, Far East and other continents," Derby County chairman Andy Pearson said.
"The immediate aim though is to continue to build the infrastructure of the club at Pride Park."
Premiership teams will divide more than 5.4 billion dollars through 2010 under their latest television deal. Even relegation, Derby County's likely fate, offers payments of more than 20 million dollars.
The National Football League's 32 clubs are the only ones in American sport offering greater television revenue, but the global opportunities of American football are more limited in scope than those of the "real" football.
Add the potential for modern new stadiums in many places, including related neighborhood businesses, and the legacy of loyal fan bases dating to the 19th Century and the attraction is easy to understand from a business standpoint.
Liverpool's purchase last year by George Gillett, who owns hockey's Montreal Canadiens, and Tom Hicks, who owns hockey's Dallas Stars and baseball's Texas Rangers, caused concern over an ousting of famed venue Anfield.
"Tom and I are a little put off that people assume everything is about money," Gillett said in announcing the deal.
"If you ask which word we really feel about the franchise, I would say respect - respect for winning, for the passion, the tradition, the awesome legacy of this club."
Such homage to heritage has followed the 2005 burning effigies and "Yankee Go Home" signs by Manchester United fans for American football club owner Malcolm Glazer after his purchase of the famed team for 1.49 billion dollars.
Man United made a marketing deal with baseball's New York Yankees that helped drive each team's brand into new areas.
Hicks told USA Today when he made the Liverpool deal that a triumphant Premiership side can bring untold profit potential around the world, seeing English clubs as underdevloped brand names.
"We very much want to build a brand, particularly in Asia, but also in North America and South America, as well as Europe," he said.
Randy Lerner, owner of the National Football League's Cleveland Browns, bought Aston Villa in 2006 for 118 million dollars.
And Stan Kroenke, owner of hockey's Colorado Avalanche and basketball's Denver Nuggets, last year bought a 12 percent stake in Arsenal.
Other non-English Premiership owners include Russian oil billionaire Roman Abramovich at Chelsea, Egypt's Mohamed al-Fayed at Fulham, and an Iceland group at West Ham United.
Also former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra at Manchester City, Alexandre Gaydamak, the son of a Russian billionaire, with Portsmouth and Hong Kong businessman Carson Yeung poised to take over Birmingham at the end of the season.
Manchester United and Arsenal top the Premiership ladder with Chelsea, Everton, Aston Villa and Liverpool next.
Written by: AFP
Derby County´s Pride Park football ground is seen on January 28, as the English Premier league club announced an investment partnership with U.S. sports group General Sports and Entertainment (GSE).
DETROIT, Michigan (AFP) - Fully half of English football's 20 Premiership clubs are owned by foreign investors with a US group completing the purchase of basement-dwelling Derby County for a reported 100 million dollars.
The allure of sport squads linked to a global brand like England's elite league with television riches and home-area expansion potential have enticed Americans to also purchase Manchester United, Aston Villa and Liverpool.
"The long-term aid is to establish the Derby County brand worldwide through successful alliances with sporting teams in the US, Far East and other continents," Derby County chairman Andy Pearson said.
"The immediate aim though is to continue to build the infrastructure of the club at Pride Park."
Premiership teams will divide more than 5.4 billion dollars through 2010 under their latest television deal. Even relegation, Derby County's likely fate, offers payments of more than 20 million dollars.
The National Football League's 32 clubs are the only ones in American sport offering greater television revenue, but the global opportunities of American football are more limited in scope than those of the "real" football.
Add the potential for modern new stadiums in many places, including related neighborhood businesses, and the legacy of loyal fan bases dating to the 19th Century and the attraction is easy to understand from a business standpoint.
Liverpool's purchase last year by George Gillett, who owns hockey's Montreal Canadiens, and Tom Hicks, who owns hockey's Dallas Stars and baseball's Texas Rangers, caused concern over an ousting of famed venue Anfield.
"Tom and I are a little put off that people assume everything is about money," Gillett said in announcing the deal.
"If you ask which word we really feel about the franchise, I would say respect - respect for winning, for the passion, the tradition, the awesome legacy of this club."
Such homage to heritage has followed the 2005 burning effigies and "Yankee Go Home" signs by Manchester United fans for American football club owner Malcolm Glazer after his purchase of the famed team for 1.49 billion dollars.
Man United made a marketing deal with baseball's New York Yankees that helped drive each team's brand into new areas.
Hicks told USA Today when he made the Liverpool deal that a triumphant Premiership side can bring untold profit potential around the world, seeing English clubs as underdevloped brand names.
"We very much want to build a brand, particularly in Asia, but also in North America and South America, as well as Europe," he said.
Randy Lerner, owner of the National Football League's Cleveland Browns, bought Aston Villa in 2006 for 118 million dollars.
And Stan Kroenke, owner of hockey's Colorado Avalanche and basketball's Denver Nuggets, last year bought a 12 percent stake in Arsenal.
Other non-English Premiership owners include Russian oil billionaire Roman Abramovich at Chelsea, Egypt's Mohamed al-Fayed at Fulham, and an Iceland group at West Ham United.
Also former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra at Manchester City, Alexandre Gaydamak, the son of a Russian billionaire, with Portsmouth and Hong Kong businessman Carson Yeung poised to take over Birmingham at the end of the season.
Manchester United and Arsenal top the Premiership ladder with Chelsea, Everton, Aston Villa and Liverpool next.
2008년 1월 22일 화요일
THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOOTBALL IN THE 1990s
FIG FACT-SHEET THREE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOOTBALL IN THE 1990s
The economic situation of British football has changed massively in the last ten years: what was a hugely under-capitalised industry at the end of the 1980s (that operated on very tight margins and often had to endure enormous losses) has been transformed into a multi-million pound businesswhere the maximisation of revenue and profit are key strategic objectives for clubs and associations alike. This factsheet offers some basic information on the key points of the transformation of British football in the 1990s, and highlights some of the important academic work conducted on the nature of the game. Authors' names in the text refer to the work highlighted in the bibliography.
Introduction
A distinction needs to be drawn at the outset between the new capitalist mode of operation in modern football, and the economic basis of the sport over the previous hundred-odd years of its history. All sport has been economic since the first fan was charged an admission fee to watch a game, since the first fences and stands were put up around pitches to prevent people simply watching fixtures for free from nearby fields, and since since the first players were paid professionally. However, in the last twenty years, the need to cover costs where possible (an economic consideration - discussed by Arnold 1991, Szymanski and Kuypers 1999) has been supplanted by a desire to raise as much revenue as possible, and generate profit wherever practical (a capitalist consideration). This has drawn on the systematic erosion of principles of cross-subsidisation within football, that previously offered routes of re-distribution of income from the large successful to theirsmaller, less wealthy counterparts throughout the League. These included levies on attendance revenue, for instance. Such re-distribution was based on a desire to protect the integrity of the entire professional structure, a concern that has been successively eroded in favour of the new free market economics of the game. This new conception of the professional game has led to new conceptions of how clubs should be financed, whereby each club is deemed to be responsible for itself and no other, leading to a splitting of the top clubs from the rest.
This shift, that has underpinned much of the transformation of football in the UK, was not accidental, nor can it be seen as simply an inevitable form of "modernisation" of the sport to fit wider social values and trends. The policies that have been pursued in the organisation of football in the 1990s were the product of a political/economic project deliberately aimed at generating revenue and profit, and of detaching the biggest clubs from the smaller ones. This was the logic behind the constant threats by the "Big Five" clubs in the late 1980s (Liverpool, Everton, Manchester United, Arsenal, Tottenham) to split from the rest of the Football League if they did not receive a greater share of TV revenues (Conn 1997). The path laid down is therefore best seen as the result of deliberate choices, that have proved remarkably successful in economic terms. Central to the transformation of the game was the arrival ofthe new business entrepreneurs in the game from the 1980s onwards: chairmen such as Doug Ellis at Aston Villa, Ken Bates at Chelsea, Irving Scholar at Tottenham brought experience of the non-football business world, new ways of thinking about the commercial and financial opportunities within the game, and new preparedness to work with commercial interests. These directors and chairmen brought a new attitude to the financing of the game, and brought knowledge and experience to the game that had previously been lacking and had not been sought either. Equally, the arrival of Sky TV and the hundreds of millions of pounds they paid for exclusive coverage of the FA Premier League, forms the starting point for the development of a much more sophisticated and developed football business.
Stadia
Within this context of new professional people being brought into the game, and growing pressures within the top clubs for greater shares of revenue, the impact of the Hillsborough disaster of 1989 gave a massive impetus to the development of the football business in the UK (Duke 1994). The requirementslaid down by Government following the Taylor Reports into the Hillsborough disaster for the redevelopment of football stadia lead to millions of pounds of taxpayers' money to pay for the removal of terraces from top stadia, and for general reconstruction of stadium facilities. While clubs did spend many millions of pounds of their own money, together with money received from the Football Trust for ground redevelopment, clubs were able to draw on Government help to create new stands and stadia up and down the country that offered the prospect of generating significantly increased revenues on both match and non-match days. Combined with the existing desire already visible amongst the top clubs to generate increased revenues and to keep more of the money tat was being earned, this lead not only to the sharp raising of ticket prices at top facilities, but also the development of new corporate facilities and other devices to attract new more affluent supporters to the game.
At the same time, the attitude of clubs towards revenue and profit changed dramatically: the previous decades had seen clubs operating as "utility maximisers" (Arnold 1991), that is functioning with the primary concern of winning trophies while seeking to perform as economically as possible. There was no attempt to maximise revenue or profit, and the structure and daily operations of clubs were geared not to commercial considerations, but to generating success on the pitch. This attitude has been progressively lost over the course of the 1990s, with not just the top clubs much more concerned to maximise revenue and generate a profit, regardless of success on the pitch. The most common strategy adopted to achieve this has massive diversification based around a new, proactive approach towards commercial opportunities. Progressively, top clubs have massively expanded the range of commercial features and facilities on offer to supporters, and expanded the range and scope of their commercial operations, especially in regard to the new facilities put in place in stadia as part of post-Taylor reconstruction.
The need to redevelop stadia coincided with the desire to increase revenue, leading to the construction of themed cafes, bars and restaurants, the sale of franchised outlets in some grounds (Liverpool FC has a McDonald's store at Anfield, for instance), expanded and enhanced visitor centres and museums, much bigger and wide-ranging club shops and "mega-stores", hotels and conference centres (an approach adoptedby Chelsea FC in the Chelsea Village, and Sheffield United at Bramall Lane, and a feature that was part of the original plan for the new national stadium at Wembley), and the development of much larger merchandise ranges. These new types of merchandise range from club badged motorbikes (as offered by Chelsea forinstance), club credit cards and mobile phones, and expanded leisurewear ranges, alongside the moretraditional flags, replica club shirts, scarves, household items etc. Not only has this contributed to a massiveexpansion in the revenue (and sometimes profits) of clubs, but it is part of an attempt to fundamentally alter the social meaning of the sport, moving it towards other leisure experiences: football clubs now view their"product" as being in direct competition to cinemas, home entertainment and other sporting events. Merchandise and other additional elements around the actual football are deliberately targeted at the new preferred demographic of supporter, the more affluent supporters, those who attend in families and the less"loyal". Those who attend games are increasingly constructed as "consumers" rather than "fans", driven by a desire for entertainment, rather than expressing a loyalty or strong personal identity (King 1997). This alsoextends to the creation of large-scale hinterlands of support for British clubs abroad, which are increasinglydeliberately targeted and created by top clubs (Nash 2001, Goksoyr and Hognestad 1999).
Part of this same project of maximising revenue and offering a new social meaning for the game have beenattempts to maximise the usage made of most clubs' key asset, the stadium. Whereas in the past, stadiawould only be used on match-day, and did not offer anything other than the football match, stadia at top clubs are being progressively moved towards six-day operations in an attempt to increase revenue generated, and to make the stadium a place to visit in itself. The stadium thus becomes a leisure and tourist facility in its own right, especially for affluent families with high levels of disposable income. The museums and stadium tours now commonplace at British stadia are examples of these objectives. Another reason to do this,in theory, is to release clubs' financial performance from dependence on the team's performance: by creating new fan-bases who interact with the club on the basis of entertainment, leisure and "lifestyle" choices, clubshope to create revenue streams that would not be overly affected by declines in the team performance: gatereceipts, sponsorship and advertising revenue, and television revenue all generally decline if a team is relegated. The new facilities at stadia can be advertised, and therefore hopefully used, regardless of the team's actual performances (such as hotels and conference centres).
Marketing and market research
As football clubs become more interested in specific target demographics, so marketing and market research have become increasingly significant. Football has radically shifted its attitude towards marketing: twenty years ago, football had no understanding of either the need or the opportunities presented by marketing, and had no desire to do so either. Football clubs have now developed increasingly more sophisticated forms of marketing, bringing in professional marketing expertise from outside the game, and creating dedicated marketing departments, that increasingly are taking over ticket departments as well. Increasing amounts of money are being expended on the development and sophistication of marketing departments, which are seen as increasingly important ways of increasing brand awareness, and advertising the club and its fixtures. Secondly, there have been moves towards developing regular forms of market research of the fan-base, often in conjunction with sponsors and other commercial interests, both to measure the popularity of existing policies and the prospects for new developments (such as ParPerView). The prime example is the annual Carling survey conducted on behalf of the FA Premier League, which not only detail how spectators view current arrangements in football, but how they would respond to certain new developments.
The Financial Revolution
The various forces at work in this transformation, the redevelopment of stadia, the diversification and commodification, the desire to maximise revenue and profit, have combined to create a totally new situationwithin the modern game whereby top clubs have transformed their economic and financial strength, and to draw on the massive hype and popularity of modern British football (fed in large measure by Sky TV) to become instantly recognisable, much-discussed and well-known brands. However the consequence of all the extra millions of pounds that have entered the game since 1992, generated by a massive growth in the value of sponsorships (Vodafone paid £30m to sponsor Manchester United from 2000 onwards), the value of advertising and the huge expansion in revenue received directly from TV (primarily from Sky, but also ITV), has been to increase on an enormous scale the gap between the top clubs and the rest of the English game: wages and transfer fees in the lower divisions have been dragged upwards, partly due to the massive expansion of wages in the Premier League, so placing significant extra financial burdens on precisely those clubs who cannot compete in marketing or advertising terms with the top five or six clubs in the country, precisely those clubs who have to work much harder to maintain an active and non-active fan-bases and precisely those clubs who generate less revenue in the first place due to the structure of the professional game. This has been fuelled yet further by significant speculation in the transfer market by Premier League clubs, prepared to spend tens of millions of pounds of players either to ensure that they remain within the financially-lucrative Premier League, or that they qualify for the even more lucrative UEFA Champions League. These trends were identified by Deloitte and Touche in their annual Football Finance review. The 2000 editionfound that:
• The turnover of the top five Premier League clubs was larger than the whole turnover of the seventy-two clubs in the Football League.
• The three highest Premier League spenders on player wages were greater than the entire wage bill of all the forty-eight clubs in Football Divisions League Two and Three combined (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 11)
However, even within the Premier League, significant sums of money are lost every year: Deloitte and Touchefound that Blackburn Rovers had pre-tax losses in 1999 of nearly £8m, Everton of £10.8m, Liverpool of £8m, Leicester City of £6.1m and Sheffield Wednesday of £9.2m (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 66).
The financial position of many clubs has not, therefore, actually improved, despite all the new finance injectedinto the game, as most of it is simply paid straight out again in hyper-inflating transfer fees and players' wages. Deloitte and Touche found that average wage costs increased between 1998 and 1999 across the PremierLeague by 29% (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 66), and that nearly half of the operating profit (before transfers) of the entire Premier League in 1999 was generated by Manchester United alone. Profitability remains little morethan a distant objective for many clubs, and there are a number of British clubs either in administration or close to it(Hull City, Crystal Palace, Airdrie and QPR, to name just four in the last two years). Clubs like Sheffield Wednesday and Nottingham Forest FC (both relegated from the Premier League in recent years) are reported to owe over £15m apiece, while Everton FC are reported to owe £20m. Until wage levels are brought under stricter control (and this seems unlikely in view of the power of the players and their agents over clubs, and successive changes to the transfer system since 1995), most football clubs will remain relatively unprofitable, despite the enormoussums of money top sides can hope to generate.
While football is still a very small industry compared to wider capitalist industries in the UK (Premier League clubs generated £669m turnover excluding transfer fees in 1999), the financial position of the top division has beenchanged beyond all recognition since 1992, and future developments in the industry (PayPerView, primarily, but also the Internet) are expected by many to generate even larger sums for a select group of British clubs. The explosion in the financial aspects of the game has also brought with it a much greater need for professional skills at clubs and associations, in the areas of legal knowledge, marketing and sponsorship experience, accounting and financial control, administration and personnel skills. The commercial revolution has led to a huge expansion of the "back-room" staff at any British club, in order to facilitate the strategic exploitation of the commercial opportunities now on offer.
Media companies and the Football Business
These opportunities have also been recognised by a range of media companies, who have increasingly sought totake stakes in top British clubs. Granada own 9.9% of Liverpool FC, while Sky own 9.9% stakes in Leeds United, Chelsea and Sunderland; NTL own 9.9% of Newcastle United FC and Aston Villa. Sky also tried, unsuccessfully,to buy Manchester United PLC for over £600m in 1998. These stakes, and the combination of football clubs and media expertise and technology that they represent, are testimony to the enormous financial potential andinvestment opportunities that are still perceived to exist in the modern British football industry. While most of the revenue projections for PPV or Internet coverage are based on some questionable assumptions about take-up rate and the level that supporters would be prepared to pay, the expectation that these technological innovations will generate yet more millions of pounds for the game has drawn huge media companies even more into the heart of the football industry. How such developments will affect the power-balance of the game, the competitive balance of individual leagues, the social meaning of football, the ability of all social demographics to actively participate in professional football, and the rest of the British professional game is another matter entirely (Brown 1998, Nash 2001, Lee 1998, Nash 2000, Conn 1997). The fact that the transformation of the game is essentially contested territory, and has created winners and losers within British football, underpins the desire of the British Government's Football Taskforce to ensure that the commercial revolution in football is wedded to concepts of social responsibility, social inclusion, community work and anti-racist practices (Football Taskforce 1999).
Further reading
• Arnold T (1991) 'Rich man, poor man: economic arrangements in the Football League', Williams J and Wagg S (Eds.) (1991) Getting into Europe, London, Leicester UP, pp48-67
• Brown A (1998) (Ed.) Fanatics! Power, Identity and fandom in football, London, Routledge
• Brown A and Walsh A (1999) Not for Sale, Edinburgh, Mainstream
• Conn D (1997) The Football Business: Fair Play in the 1990s, Edinburgh, Mainstream
• Deloitte and Touche (2000) Annual Review of Football Finance, Manchester, Deloitte and Touche
• Duke V (1994) 'The drive to modernisation and the supermarket imperative' in Giuilanotti R & Williams J (1994) Game without Frontier, Arena, Aldershot
• Football Taskforce (1999) Report on Commercial Issues, London, Football Taskforce
• Goksoyr M and Hognestad H (1999) 'No longer worlds apart? British influences in Norwegian football' in Armstrong& Giulianotti (Eds) Football Culture and Identities, London, MacMillan.
• King A (1997) 'New Directors, Customers and Fans: the transformation of English football in the 1990s' in Sociology of Sport, Vol. 14:3, pp224-241
* Lee S (1998) 'Grey shirts to grey suits: the political economy of English football inthe 1990s' in Brown A (1998) (Ed.) Fanatics!, London, Routledge, pp32-50
• Nash R (2000) 'The sociology of British football in the 1990s: fandom, business and future research', Football Studies, 3:1, pp49-63
• Nash R (2001) 'Globalized football fans: Liverpool FC in Scandinavia' in Football Studies, March 2001 Volume 2:2, pp5-24
• S. Hamil, J. Michie & C. Oughton (Eds.) The Business of Football. A Game of Two Halves?, Edinburgh, Mainstream, pp82-111
• Szymanski S and Kuypers T (1999) Winners and Losers, London, Viking Press
• Taylor, Lord Justice (1990) Final Report into the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, HMSO, London, CMND 962Football Industry Group, University of Liverpool, April 2001 This fact-sheet has been put together with the kind co-operation of Liverpool FC.
The economic situation of British football has changed massively in the last ten years: what was a hugely under-capitalised industry at the end of the 1980s (that operated on very tight margins and often had to endure enormous losses) has been transformed into a multi-million pound businesswhere the maximisation of revenue and profit are key strategic objectives for clubs and associations alike. This factsheet offers some basic information on the key points of the transformation of British football in the 1990s, and highlights some of the important academic work conducted on the nature of the game. Authors' names in the text refer to the work highlighted in the bibliography.
Introduction
A distinction needs to be drawn at the outset between the new capitalist mode of operation in modern football, and the economic basis of the sport over the previous hundred-odd years of its history. All sport has been economic since the first fan was charged an admission fee to watch a game, since the first fences and stands were put up around pitches to prevent people simply watching fixtures for free from nearby fields, and since since the first players were paid professionally. However, in the last twenty years, the need to cover costs where possible (an economic consideration - discussed by Arnold 1991, Szymanski and Kuypers 1999) has been supplanted by a desire to raise as much revenue as possible, and generate profit wherever practical (a capitalist consideration). This has drawn on the systematic erosion of principles of cross-subsidisation within football, that previously offered routes of re-distribution of income from the large successful to theirsmaller, less wealthy counterparts throughout the League. These included levies on attendance revenue, for instance. Such re-distribution was based on a desire to protect the integrity of the entire professional structure, a concern that has been successively eroded in favour of the new free market economics of the game. This new conception of the professional game has led to new conceptions of how clubs should be financed, whereby each club is deemed to be responsible for itself and no other, leading to a splitting of the top clubs from the rest.
This shift, that has underpinned much of the transformation of football in the UK, was not accidental, nor can it be seen as simply an inevitable form of "modernisation" of the sport to fit wider social values and trends. The policies that have been pursued in the organisation of football in the 1990s were the product of a political/economic project deliberately aimed at generating revenue and profit, and of detaching the biggest clubs from the smaller ones. This was the logic behind the constant threats by the "Big Five" clubs in the late 1980s (Liverpool, Everton, Manchester United, Arsenal, Tottenham) to split from the rest of the Football League if they did not receive a greater share of TV revenues (Conn 1997). The path laid down is therefore best seen as the result of deliberate choices, that have proved remarkably successful in economic terms. Central to the transformation of the game was the arrival ofthe new business entrepreneurs in the game from the 1980s onwards: chairmen such as Doug Ellis at Aston Villa, Ken Bates at Chelsea, Irving Scholar at Tottenham brought experience of the non-football business world, new ways of thinking about the commercial and financial opportunities within the game, and new preparedness to work with commercial interests. These directors and chairmen brought a new attitude to the financing of the game, and brought knowledge and experience to the game that had previously been lacking and had not been sought either. Equally, the arrival of Sky TV and the hundreds of millions of pounds they paid for exclusive coverage of the FA Premier League, forms the starting point for the development of a much more sophisticated and developed football business.
Stadia
Within this context of new professional people being brought into the game, and growing pressures within the top clubs for greater shares of revenue, the impact of the Hillsborough disaster of 1989 gave a massive impetus to the development of the football business in the UK (Duke 1994). The requirementslaid down by Government following the Taylor Reports into the Hillsborough disaster for the redevelopment of football stadia lead to millions of pounds of taxpayers' money to pay for the removal of terraces from top stadia, and for general reconstruction of stadium facilities. While clubs did spend many millions of pounds of their own money, together with money received from the Football Trust for ground redevelopment, clubs were able to draw on Government help to create new stands and stadia up and down the country that offered the prospect of generating significantly increased revenues on both match and non-match days. Combined with the existing desire already visible amongst the top clubs to generate increased revenues and to keep more of the money tat was being earned, this lead not only to the sharp raising of ticket prices at top facilities, but also the development of new corporate facilities and other devices to attract new more affluent supporters to the game.
At the same time, the attitude of clubs towards revenue and profit changed dramatically: the previous decades had seen clubs operating as "utility maximisers" (Arnold 1991), that is functioning with the primary concern of winning trophies while seeking to perform as economically as possible. There was no attempt to maximise revenue or profit, and the structure and daily operations of clubs were geared not to commercial considerations, but to generating success on the pitch. This attitude has been progressively lost over the course of the 1990s, with not just the top clubs much more concerned to maximise revenue and generate a profit, regardless of success on the pitch. The most common strategy adopted to achieve this has massive diversification based around a new, proactive approach towards commercial opportunities. Progressively, top clubs have massively expanded the range of commercial features and facilities on offer to supporters, and expanded the range and scope of their commercial operations, especially in regard to the new facilities put in place in stadia as part of post-Taylor reconstruction.
The need to redevelop stadia coincided with the desire to increase revenue, leading to the construction of themed cafes, bars and restaurants, the sale of franchised outlets in some grounds (Liverpool FC has a McDonald's store at Anfield, for instance), expanded and enhanced visitor centres and museums, much bigger and wide-ranging club shops and "mega-stores", hotels and conference centres (an approach adoptedby Chelsea FC in the Chelsea Village, and Sheffield United at Bramall Lane, and a feature that was part of the original plan for the new national stadium at Wembley), and the development of much larger merchandise ranges. These new types of merchandise range from club badged motorbikes (as offered by Chelsea forinstance), club credit cards and mobile phones, and expanded leisurewear ranges, alongside the moretraditional flags, replica club shirts, scarves, household items etc. Not only has this contributed to a massiveexpansion in the revenue (and sometimes profits) of clubs, but it is part of an attempt to fundamentally alter the social meaning of the sport, moving it towards other leisure experiences: football clubs now view their"product" as being in direct competition to cinemas, home entertainment and other sporting events. Merchandise and other additional elements around the actual football are deliberately targeted at the new preferred demographic of supporter, the more affluent supporters, those who attend in families and the less"loyal". Those who attend games are increasingly constructed as "consumers" rather than "fans", driven by a desire for entertainment, rather than expressing a loyalty or strong personal identity (King 1997). This alsoextends to the creation of large-scale hinterlands of support for British clubs abroad, which are increasinglydeliberately targeted and created by top clubs (Nash 2001, Goksoyr and Hognestad 1999).
Part of this same project of maximising revenue and offering a new social meaning for the game have beenattempts to maximise the usage made of most clubs' key asset, the stadium. Whereas in the past, stadiawould only be used on match-day, and did not offer anything other than the football match, stadia at top clubs are being progressively moved towards six-day operations in an attempt to increase revenue generated, and to make the stadium a place to visit in itself. The stadium thus becomes a leisure and tourist facility in its own right, especially for affluent families with high levels of disposable income. The museums and stadium tours now commonplace at British stadia are examples of these objectives. Another reason to do this,in theory, is to release clubs' financial performance from dependence on the team's performance: by creating new fan-bases who interact with the club on the basis of entertainment, leisure and "lifestyle" choices, clubshope to create revenue streams that would not be overly affected by declines in the team performance: gatereceipts, sponsorship and advertising revenue, and television revenue all generally decline if a team is relegated. The new facilities at stadia can be advertised, and therefore hopefully used, regardless of the team's actual performances (such as hotels and conference centres).
Marketing and market research
As football clubs become more interested in specific target demographics, so marketing and market research have become increasingly significant. Football has radically shifted its attitude towards marketing: twenty years ago, football had no understanding of either the need or the opportunities presented by marketing, and had no desire to do so either. Football clubs have now developed increasingly more sophisticated forms of marketing, bringing in professional marketing expertise from outside the game, and creating dedicated marketing departments, that increasingly are taking over ticket departments as well. Increasing amounts of money are being expended on the development and sophistication of marketing departments, which are seen as increasingly important ways of increasing brand awareness, and advertising the club and its fixtures. Secondly, there have been moves towards developing regular forms of market research of the fan-base, often in conjunction with sponsors and other commercial interests, both to measure the popularity of existing policies and the prospects for new developments (such as ParPerView). The prime example is the annual Carling survey conducted on behalf of the FA Premier League, which not only detail how spectators view current arrangements in football, but how they would respond to certain new developments.
The Financial Revolution
The various forces at work in this transformation, the redevelopment of stadia, the diversification and commodification, the desire to maximise revenue and profit, have combined to create a totally new situationwithin the modern game whereby top clubs have transformed their economic and financial strength, and to draw on the massive hype and popularity of modern British football (fed in large measure by Sky TV) to become instantly recognisable, much-discussed and well-known brands. However the consequence of all the extra millions of pounds that have entered the game since 1992, generated by a massive growth in the value of sponsorships (Vodafone paid £30m to sponsor Manchester United from 2000 onwards), the value of advertising and the huge expansion in revenue received directly from TV (primarily from Sky, but also ITV), has been to increase on an enormous scale the gap between the top clubs and the rest of the English game: wages and transfer fees in the lower divisions have been dragged upwards, partly due to the massive expansion of wages in the Premier League, so placing significant extra financial burdens on precisely those clubs who cannot compete in marketing or advertising terms with the top five or six clubs in the country, precisely those clubs who have to work much harder to maintain an active and non-active fan-bases and precisely those clubs who generate less revenue in the first place due to the structure of the professional game. This has been fuelled yet further by significant speculation in the transfer market by Premier League clubs, prepared to spend tens of millions of pounds of players either to ensure that they remain within the financially-lucrative Premier League, or that they qualify for the even more lucrative UEFA Champions League. These trends were identified by Deloitte and Touche in their annual Football Finance review. The 2000 editionfound that:
• The turnover of the top five Premier League clubs was larger than the whole turnover of the seventy-two clubs in the Football League.
• The three highest Premier League spenders on player wages were greater than the entire wage bill of all the forty-eight clubs in Football Divisions League Two and Three combined (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 11)
However, even within the Premier League, significant sums of money are lost every year: Deloitte and Touchefound that Blackburn Rovers had pre-tax losses in 1999 of nearly £8m, Everton of £10.8m, Liverpool of £8m, Leicester City of £6.1m and Sheffield Wednesday of £9.2m (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 66).
The financial position of many clubs has not, therefore, actually improved, despite all the new finance injectedinto the game, as most of it is simply paid straight out again in hyper-inflating transfer fees and players' wages. Deloitte and Touche found that average wage costs increased between 1998 and 1999 across the PremierLeague by 29% (Deloitte and Touche 2000, page 66), and that nearly half of the operating profit (before transfers) of the entire Premier League in 1999 was generated by Manchester United alone. Profitability remains little morethan a distant objective for many clubs, and there are a number of British clubs either in administration or close to it(Hull City, Crystal Palace, Airdrie and QPR, to name just four in the last two years). Clubs like Sheffield Wednesday and Nottingham Forest FC (both relegated from the Premier League in recent years) are reported to owe over £15m apiece, while Everton FC are reported to owe £20m. Until wage levels are brought under stricter control (and this seems unlikely in view of the power of the players and their agents over clubs, and successive changes to the transfer system since 1995), most football clubs will remain relatively unprofitable, despite the enormoussums of money top sides can hope to generate.
While football is still a very small industry compared to wider capitalist industries in the UK (Premier League clubs generated £669m turnover excluding transfer fees in 1999), the financial position of the top division has beenchanged beyond all recognition since 1992, and future developments in the industry (PayPerView, primarily, but also the Internet) are expected by many to generate even larger sums for a select group of British clubs. The explosion in the financial aspects of the game has also brought with it a much greater need for professional skills at clubs and associations, in the areas of legal knowledge, marketing and sponsorship experience, accounting and financial control, administration and personnel skills. The commercial revolution has led to a huge expansion of the "back-room" staff at any British club, in order to facilitate the strategic exploitation of the commercial opportunities now on offer.
Media companies and the Football Business
These opportunities have also been recognised by a range of media companies, who have increasingly sought totake stakes in top British clubs. Granada own 9.9% of Liverpool FC, while Sky own 9.9% stakes in Leeds United, Chelsea and Sunderland; NTL own 9.9% of Newcastle United FC and Aston Villa. Sky also tried, unsuccessfully,to buy Manchester United PLC for over £600m in 1998. These stakes, and the combination of football clubs and media expertise and technology that they represent, are testimony to the enormous financial potential andinvestment opportunities that are still perceived to exist in the modern British football industry. While most of the revenue projections for PPV or Internet coverage are based on some questionable assumptions about take-up rate and the level that supporters would be prepared to pay, the expectation that these technological innovations will generate yet more millions of pounds for the game has drawn huge media companies even more into the heart of the football industry. How such developments will affect the power-balance of the game, the competitive balance of individual leagues, the social meaning of football, the ability of all social demographics to actively participate in professional football, and the rest of the British professional game is another matter entirely (Brown 1998, Nash 2001, Lee 1998, Nash 2000, Conn 1997). The fact that the transformation of the game is essentially contested territory, and has created winners and losers within British football, underpins the desire of the British Government's Football Taskforce to ensure that the commercial revolution in football is wedded to concepts of social responsibility, social inclusion, community work and anti-racist practices (Football Taskforce 1999).
Further reading
• Arnold T (1991) 'Rich man, poor man: economic arrangements in the Football League', Williams J and Wagg S (Eds.) (1991) Getting into Europe, London, Leicester UP, pp48-67
• Brown A (1998) (Ed.) Fanatics! Power, Identity and fandom in football, London, Routledge
• Brown A and Walsh A (1999) Not for Sale, Edinburgh, Mainstream
• Conn D (1997) The Football Business: Fair Play in the 1990s, Edinburgh, Mainstream
• Deloitte and Touche (2000) Annual Review of Football Finance, Manchester, Deloitte and Touche
• Duke V (1994) 'The drive to modernisation and the supermarket imperative' in Giuilanotti R & Williams J (1994) Game without Frontier, Arena, Aldershot
• Football Taskforce (1999) Report on Commercial Issues, London, Football Taskforce
• Goksoyr M and Hognestad H (1999) 'No longer worlds apart? British influences in Norwegian football' in Armstrong& Giulianotti (Eds) Football Culture and Identities, London, MacMillan.
• King A (1997) 'New Directors, Customers and Fans: the transformation of English football in the 1990s' in Sociology of Sport, Vol. 14:3, pp224-241
* Lee S (1998) 'Grey shirts to grey suits: the political economy of English football inthe 1990s' in Brown A (1998) (Ed.) Fanatics!, London, Routledge, pp32-50
• Nash R (2000) 'The sociology of British football in the 1990s: fandom, business and future research', Football Studies, 3:1, pp49-63
• Nash R (2001) 'Globalized football fans: Liverpool FC in Scandinavia' in Football Studies, March 2001 Volume 2:2, pp5-24
• S. Hamil, J. Michie & C. Oughton (Eds.) The Business of Football. A Game of Two Halves?, Edinburgh, Mainstream, pp82-111
• Szymanski S and Kuypers T (1999) Winners and Losers, London, Viking Press
• Taylor, Lord Justice (1990) Final Report into the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, HMSO, London, CMND 962Football Industry Group, University of Liverpool, April 2001 This fact-sheet has been put together with the kind co-operation of Liverpool FC.
2008년 1월 20일 일요일
HOOLIGANISM
FIG FACT-SHEET FOUR: HOOLIGANISM
WHAT IS 'FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM'?
Football hooliganism has no specific legal definition. The term was created by the media, the tabloid press in particular, in the mid-1960s and since then they have been extremely flexible and indeterminate in ascribing the "hooligan" label to different incidents. Football hooliganism is seen by most to mean violence and/or disorder involving football fans. However there are two very specific 'types' of disorder that have been labelled 'hooliganism': (a) Spontaneous and usually low level disorder caused by fans at or around football matches (the type that typically occurs at England away matches), and (b) Deliberate and intentional violence involving organised gangs (or 'firms') who attach themselves to football clubs and fight firms from other clubs, sometimes a long way in time and space from a match. Therefore if you are using the term 'football hooliganism' in your work, be very clear about what it is you are referring to!
WHEN DID FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM FIRST OCCUR?
Traditionally, football hooliganism has been seen as first occurring in the late 1960's, and peaking in the late 1970's and mid 1980's before calming down following the Heysel and Hillsborough disasters. However, incidents of crowd disorder at football matches have been recorded as early as the 19th Century. During a match in 1846 in Derby the riot act was read and two troops of dragoons called in to deal with a disorderly crowd, whilst pitch invasions became increasingly common from the 1880's onwards. The paucity of accurate figures, official or otherwise, makes it difficult to gauge the frequency and severity of such episodes. The picture is clouded further by the prevalent leniency given at the time toward crowd disturbances that didn't actually interfere with the game. It is often claimed that hooliganism at football matches became much more prevalent in the 1970's and 1980's, with more reported wide-scale violence at matches. However, again it is difficult to know whether the amount of disorder increased or whether the growing media interest in, and coverage of, crowd disorder has meant it is reported far more regularly. Certainly analysis of certain incidents of disorder (e.g. Sweden v England, Sept. 1989) reveals substantial and irresponsible exaggeration of violence involving supporters by both tabloid and broadsheet press.
THE MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM
The issue of the media's coverage of football hooliganism is very important as it is the media that helped construct the public’s understanding and view of the phenomenon. Within Britain the tabloid press in particular have found hooliganism to be an easy target for the kind of sensationalist reporting that boosts their circulation. This sensationalist style of reporting often relies on powerful headlines grounded in violent imagery and war metaphors whilst articles are regularly 'edited for impact'. This style of reporting has developed over the past 50 years sparked by the moral panic of the 1950's at the rise of juvenile crime and delinquency. Some argue that the tabloids’ style of reporting, such as the publishing of league tables of hooligan notoriety (Daily Mirror 1974) serve to encourage hooligans by placing them in the limelight. The tabloids have also been accused of helping to incite hooliganism by promoting xenophobia. For instance prior to England's semi-final clash with Germany in Euro 96 the Daily Mirror ran a headline of 'Achtung Surrender' whilst the Sun went with 'Let's Blitz Fritz'.
Central to the understanding of the media's role in our understanding of Hooliganism is what Stuart Hall calls the 'amplification spiral' of sensationalist media reporting feeding a desire for more stories that can lead to a widespread and unnecessary 'moral panic' suggesting the problem was actually worse than in reality it was. This is in turn often precipitates a call for tougher control measures which when implemented can create further confrontation and draw yet more people in to become involved. The tabloid press in the 1970s and 80s in particular therefore helped to amplify the problem and create a widespread panic over football hooliganism that was completely disproportionate to the actual extent of the problem.
Furthermore, this style of sensationalist reporting has also meant that the press has been able, to an extent, to influence policy decisions dealing with football hooliganism which has resulted in a variety of short sighted measures which have done little, if anything, to improve the situation. Inaccurate press constructions of why disorder involving England fans occured - and suggestions of how to control it - after disorder in Sweden (1989), Marseille (1998) and Charleroi (2000) in particular led to pressure for controversial Football Banning Orders. In contrast to the English press, it should be pointed out that in some countries the press have had a positive effect, as in Scotland and Denmark where heavy and favourable coverage of the 'Tartan Army' and the 'Rooligans' has deliberately set them apart from the hooligan perspective.
HOW SERIOUS IS FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM NOW?
Football hooliganism domestically has changed significantly since the Taylor Report of 1990. All-seater stadiums, 'Football Intelligence' and Closed Circuit Television in particular have meant that incidents of violence inside football grounds (particularly in the Premiership) are rare. In addition, arrests for football-related crimes have reduced dramatically since the late 1980's whilst attendances have risen. However, this does not mean that football hooliganism has necessarily reduced. Much football disorder has been 'pushed' from the stadium itself to other meeting places, with groups needing to be better organised. It also now has the potential to be more violent. The location of most serious disorder means that violence is rarely reported and that the Police will be less able to control it and make arrests.
As stated above, there are two different phenomena that have been labelled 'hooliganism'. First is the spontaneous and usually low-level disorder that takes place in and around stadia and when English teams travel abroad. In the UK, this is relatively rare considering the number of supporters attending matches. However, abroad, English fans have often been involved in disorder (e.g. Marseille 1998, Charleroi 2000, Slovakia 2002, Albufeira 2004, Stuttgart and Cologne 2006 and Rome 1997 and 2007). Often the extent of this disorder is exaggerated by excessive media reporting and in many cases English supporters are the victims of attacks by local fans/police rather than the aggressors. The press has typically claimed such disorder is the result of 'hooligans' traveling with the intention of fighting and being able to draw drunken English fans into disorder. However, analysis of incidents from 1990-2007 in Stott and Pearson's 'Football Hooliganism: Policing the War on the English Disease' (2007 Pennant Books) criticised this view and suggested that external factors such as indiscriminate policing and the presence of aggressive local youths were usually the cause of rioting involving english fans abroad.
Second is the more serious disorder caused by hooligan 'firms' in the UK. Domestically this is still a huge problem, with most football clubs having groups of 'risk supporters' who wish to fight rival firms. UK police have to deal with the problem of organised firms trying to confront each other on a regular basis, although the disorder is rarely reported (due to the lack of coverage of incidents) and as it usually takes place far from the ground, 'normal' fans do not tend to be directly affected by it. One example of high-profile disorder between firms (which was reported), was the clash between Everton and Manchester United 'hooligans' in 2005. Footage of this can be found on 'YouTube' under the search term 'Everton Valley'.
WHAT "MAKES" A PERSON A HOOLIGAN?
It is difficult to speculate on what makes a person become involved in football-related violence because there are so many possible causational factors. It is impossible to claim that all "football hooligans" are of a certain age or class or possess a particular "psychological make-up". Also, as we have stated, football hooliganism is not a single phenomenon - as such it does not have a single cause. In terms of organised violence between 'hooligan gangs', a feeling of community, tribalism and sheer enjoyment of being involved in football disorder is obviously in evidence.
However, the causes for spontaneous disorder abroad (e.g. France 98, Euro2000, Rome 2007) are more complex; alcohol, xenophobia and a minority of 'hooligans' have traditionally been blamed for disturbances, but the role of the police is probably most important of all. Whilst aggressive and confrontational policing tactics in Charleroi in 2000 escalated minor incidents into widescale disorder, more progressive models of policing saw only one arrest at England matches in Euro2004 in Portugal, despite an estimated 250,000 English 'football tourists' being present. In Germany for the 2006 World Cup, it was actually possible to predict when disorder would break out depending on the way in which different police forces handled the same groups of English fans. When asking why hooliganism occurs abroad involving English fans, it is just as important to ask why disorder does not usually occur, despite large numbers of drunken (sometimes xenophobic) young English men and the presence of hooligan fans!
Football hooliganism was one of the first issues to attract academics to the study of football, with sociologists, historians and psychologists developing hypotheses explaining why football hooliganism continues to occur. Some of the differing theories on the causation of football hooliganism are listed here:
Armstrong, G, Football Hooliganism: Knowing the Score', 1998, Berg
Cohen, S, ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’, in Images of Deviance, 1970, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Ingham, R et al, ‘Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context’, 1978 London: Inter-Action Inprint
Kerr, J, ‘Understanding Soccer Hooliganism’, 1994, Buckingham: Open University Press
Marsh, P, (1978) 'Aggro: The Illusion of Violence', London: Dent
Morris, D, ‘The Soccer Tribe’, 1981, London: Jonathon Cape
Murphy et al, (1990) 'Football on Trial', Routledge
Pratt, J and Salter, M, ‘A Fresh Look at Football Hooliganism’, 1984, Leisure Studies, Vol 3/2: 201
Stott, C and Pearson, G. (2007) 'Football Hooliganism: Policing and the War on the English Disease,' Pennant Books
IS FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM 'THE ENGLISH DISEASE'?
Football Hooliganism has been called the 'English Disease' on many occasions. However, it is not limited to England, and many other countries have serious hooligan problems. In Italy, violent groups within the Ultra factions have recently been involved in a number of serious violent incidents including attacks on English fans (particularly in Rome) and in 2007 were implicated in the death of a police officer. This continued serious disorder between factions of Ultras has led to ground closures and also possibly Italy's failure to host the 2012 European Championships. It is probably fair to say that Eastern Europe, Belgium and Holland all have greater problems in terms of 'hooliganism' than the UK, where disorder in and around stadia is very rare. However, perhaps the most serious football-crowd disorder takes place in sub-Saharan Africa and South America where serious crowd rioting, often iside stadia, is much more common place than in the U.K..
CAN FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM BE 'DEFEATED'?
It is unlikely that football will ever be totally free of crowd disorder. Whenever large groups of predominantly males get together, often under the influence of alcohol, there is the potential for disorder, regardless of whether there is a football match taking place or not. All manner of legal means and policing tactics have been tried to control hooliganism, including deterrent sentencing, legislation (such as the Football (Offences) Act 1991) and the creation of the Football Intelligence Unit. During the perceived height of football hooliganism in the 1970s and 80s, successive governments implemented a series of aggressive policies that contained little evidence of an understanding of hooliganism. Many served only to worsen the problem, create an increasingly confrontational attitude between fans and police, and merely drive the violence away from the immediate environment of the football ground. This culminated in the proposed I.D. Card Scheme that was described as 'using a sledgehammer to crack a nut' by Lord Justice Taylor, and abandoned after Hillsborough.
Attempts to prevent hooliganism have seen draconian legislation such as the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 introduced to prevent suspected hooligans travelling abroad. Such moves obviously have serious civil libertarian consequences for innocent fans. Furthermore, there are serious concerns about whether Banning Orders have any serious effect in reducing disorder involving English fans abroad in the light of evidence suggesting it is not "known hooligans" who actually become involved (see Stott and Pearson 2007).
However, disorder in and around English stadia has reduced spectacularly since the 1970s and 80s, and English football grounds are now certainly safer than the average town centre on a Saturday night. Furthermore, disorder abroad can be reduced by appropriate methods of policing: It IS possible to police a crowd of drunken football supporters in a way that prevents serious disorder, as was demonstrated at the 2004 European Championships in Portugal and the 2006 World Cup in Germany.
FURTHER READING
Armstrong, G. (1998) Football Hooligans: Knowing the Score. Oxford: Berg .
Armstrong, G and Hobbs, D, 'Tackled from Behind', in Giulianotti, R, Bonney, N, and Hepworth, M, (eds.), Football, Violence and Social Identity, 1994, London: Routledge
Buford, B, 'Among the Thugs', 1991, Mandarin
Hall, S, 'The Treatment of 'Football Hooligans' in the Press', in Ingham et al., (1978) Football Hooliganism: The Wider Context, London: Inter-Action Inprint
James, M, and Pearson, G, (2006) ‘Football Banning Orders in the Courts’ Journal of Criminal Law, December
Pearson, G, (1998) 'The English Disease? The Socio-Legal Construction of Football Hooliganism', Youth and Policy: The Journal of Critical Analysis No. 60, Summer: 1-15
_______, (1999) 'Legitimate Targets? The Civil Liberties of Football Fans', Journal of Civil Liberties, Vol. 4/1, 28-47
_______, (2000) 'Legislating for the Football Hooligan', in Greenfield, S (ed.), Sport and the Law, Frank Cass Publishing.
_______, (2005) ' Qualifying for Europe? The Legitimacy of Football Banning Orders 'On Complaint' under the Principle of Proportionality’ Entertainment and Sports Law Journal , Vol. 3 No. 1
_______, (2006) 'Contextualising the Football Disorder Act: Proportionality under the Hammer' in Readings in Law and Popular Culture, Eds. Greenfield, .S and Osborn, G.
Stott, C, (2003) 'Police Expectations and the Control of English Soccer Fans at Euro2000', Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Managemen, 26: 640-655
Stott, C and Pearson, G, (2006) ‘Football Banning Orders, Proportionality and Public Order’: Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 45, No. 3, July 2006: 241-254
Stott, C and Pearson, G. (2007) 'Football Hooliganism: Policing and the War on the English Disease,' London: Pennant Books
Sugden, J, (2003) 'Scum Airways: Inside Football's Underground Economy', Mainstream
Ward, C, (1989) 'Steaming In: Journal of a Football Fan': Pocket Books
CONTACTS
Dr Geoff Pearson, Football Industry Group, University of Liverpool
This fact-sheet has been put together with the kind co-operation of Liverpool FC. Thanks also to Paul O'Higgins for his work on the initial draft.
REFERENCING THIS FACTSHEET
Pearson, G. (University of Liverpool FIG Factsheet) - www.liv.ac.uk/footballindustry/hooligan.html, accessed CURRENT DATE)
Last Updated: December 2007
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